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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

seeably, the employer who receives an income execution may soon bear
the dual responsibility of protecting the rights of the judgment debtor
as well as his own.
ARTICLE 75 -

ARBITRATION

CPLR 7502(b): Federal arbitrationin the state courts-Prima
Erie & Rederi.

Paint,

In Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,'130 the
United States Supreme Court held that in a federal court action the
Federal Arbitration Act137 is controlling if the contract in question
involves interstate or maritime commerce. Because of the constant
reference to the procedure to be followed by the federal courts in
Prima Paint, there was some question as to whether state courts 38 -were
also bound to apply the federal arbitration statute in similar circumstances. 139 And, although it had been established that state law
governed in the converse situation, i.e., when an action involving an
intrastatetransaction was brought in the federal courts, 140 a definitive
statement regarding the scope of PrimaPaint in New York was lacking
until the recent Court of Appeals decision in Ludwig Mowinckels
Rederi v. Dow Chemical Co.141
The contract in Rederi contained a broad arbitration clause
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) and Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S.
736, 741-42 (1968) (dissenting opinion); see also Sweeney, Abolition of Wage Garnishment,
38 FoR HAm L. Rrv. 197 (1969); 162 N.Y.L.J. 7, July 11, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
236 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
187 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964).
138 The Federal Arbitration Act is unique in that an independent jurisdictional basis
must be established before the federal courts can take cognizance of the dispute. Indeed,
section 4 of the Act provides that "[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or
refusal of another to arbitrate ... may petition any United States district court which,
save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28." Moreover, it has been
established that the act itself does not afford federal question jurisdiction. Robert Lawrence
Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S.
801 (1960); Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bassert & Sons, Inc., 62 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir.
1933). Significantly, there was no doubt in Rederi that the federal courts could have entertained the proceeding since the very transaction which brought the conflict within the
ambit of the federal arbitration statute also provided the federal courts with jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964). Nevertheless, there may be numerous instances wherein the
contract involves interstate commerce, but the action must be brought in the state court
because requisite federal jurisdiction, e.g., failure to meet the $10,000 minimum under 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1964), is lacking. Accordingly, the law that will be applied in the state
courts has enormous practical consequences for the practitioner.
139 See Aksen, Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin- What Does It Mean?, 43 ST. Jo N's
L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1968); 7B McKaiNEY's CPLR 7501, supp. commentary at 99 (1968).
14o Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
14125 N.Y.2d 576, 255 N.E2d 774, 307 N.Y.S.2d 660, cert. denied, - U.S. - (1970).
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whereby the parties agreed to submit all questions arising out of their
agreement to arbitration in New York. In response to a demand for
arbitration, the petitioner moved for a stay on the ground that the
disputes were time-barred under the Federal Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act, 142 which the parties had incorporated in the contract. The

lower courts ruled that federal law should apply since the underlying
contract involved a maritime transaction. Accordingly, since under
federal law the issue of a time limitation is one for the arbitrator to
144
decide, 143 the petition to stay arbitration was denied.
On appeal, the petitioner argued that CPLR 7502(b), which permits the court to decide time-limitation questions, does not alter any
federally created rights since arbitration is a mere procedural device.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the underlying controversy involving a maritime transaction was solely federal in character and governed exclusively by federal substantive law. 145 Thus,

regardless of whether the limitations objection be deemed procedural
or substantive, the federal law must be applied since a contrary state
law might significantly affect the outcome of the proceedings. 146 Moreover, the Court concluded that a contrary result would encourage
forum shopping, undermine national uniformity in the interpretation
of arbitration clauses, and permit individuals to circumvent the federal
arbitration statute.
14246
143

4

7'

U.S.C. §§ 1303(6), 1804, 1311 (1964).

Compare 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1964) with CPLR 7502(b).

144 Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Dow Chem. Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 372, 297 N.Y.S.2d
1011 (1st Dep't 1969). See also The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 313, 350-51
(1969).
145 See Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 888 US. 395, 405 (1968):
The question in this case ... is not whether Congress may fashion federal sub-

stantive rules to govern .

.

. simple diversity cases. .

.

. Rather, the question is

whether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves
with respect to subject matter which Congress plainly has power to legislate.
And it is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based
upon and confined to the incontestable federal foundations of "control over
interstate commerce and over admiralty."
By fashioning the Federal Arbitration Act as substantive rather than procedural, the
Supreme Court was able to drcumvent the application of state law in Prima Paint, a
result that would have been mandated by Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1988). See
Note, Federal Arbitration Act and Application of the "Separability Doctrine" in Federal

Courts, 1968 DuKE L. REv. 588, 607. However, this approach, in turn, may have raised

converse Erie problems for the state courts. See Note, The Federal Arbitration Act in
State Courts: Converse Erie Problems, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 623 (1970).
146 Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).

147 Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 880 U.S. 460, 468 (1965): "The 'outcome-determination' test
cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement
of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." See also C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COuRTs 227-28 (2d ed. 1970).

